analysis: Pointing fingers —Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi
The blame game between India and Pakistan serves the political agendas of both hard-line Hindus and hard-line Muslims, who have always opposed normalisation of India-Pakistan relations
The Mumbai terrorist attacks, the worst suffered by India, have drawn attention to, once again, the growing menace of terrorism against state and society in South Asia. The magnitude of this attack was far greater than the suicide attack on the Marriott in Islamabad on September 20. These attacks have shaken India just like the Marriott blast jolted Pakistan, and have spread insecurity throughout India. They have also embarrassed the Indian government for the security lapses that made it possible for a group of terrorists to launch such a coordinated attack.
The Mumbai attacks do not fit into the pattern of terrorism witnessed since 9/11. Normally, militant Islamist groups planted or lobbed bombs, sent suicide bombers, or launched quick assaults on their targets. Such attacks lasted for a few hours, if not less. There were instances of hostage-taking, but invariably the terrorists would take the hostages to their camps or hideouts.
In Mumbai, however, the attackers struck in a highly coordinated manner and were entrenched in the hotels for almost three days, using small arms to engage the security forces. This indicates a lot of planning and shipping of weapons in large quantities from outside Mumbai. This effort would have taken several days, if not weeks.
This incident will help India’s official circles and political leadership understand Pakistan’s predicament. Pakistan has experienced intense violence perpetrated by radical groups, causing insecurity across the country. India will soon learn what Pakistan already knows: it is not easy to control shadowy militant groups, especially when they cultivate support in sections of society.
Now India is facing a similar challenge of coping with local radical groups that have proliferated over the years. These groups are the product mainly, though not exclusively, of the alienation of marginal segments of Indian society. Some of these groups have adopted violence and radical ideology to challenge what they view as an unjust and exploitative Indian state.
Modern communication technology and convenient travel across the globe makes it easier for such groups to interact with each other, often getting inspired by each other’s ideologies. However, the real identity of such groups is local and regional, and they function autonomous of each other.
Instead of speculating on the identity of those responsible for the Mumbai attacks, there is a need to carefully examine the evidence. Such a massive and coordinated operation is beyond the capacity of an external group unless it has developed strong links with a well-entrenched and powerful domestic group. It could also be a combination of elements from the criminal underworld of Mumbai and a violent group with a strong anti-India agenda. Given the power and reach of the Mumbai underworld, this combination cannot be ruled out.
It is interesting that Indian security agencies failed to detect such a massive operation during its planning stage, but wasted little time in fixing the blame on some Pakistani group. If they knew who was responsible, why could they not pre-empt it?
India needs to face the reality of homegrown radicalism, and realise the futility of blaming Pakistan for its troubles. There are three major groups that challenging the Indian state.
First, there are several dissident and separatist groups that use violence to challenge the Indian state and assert their primacy in their respective areas of operation. These include the violent groups in north-eastern states, especially Assam, that have a long tradition of taking on officials and state symbols. Many radical groups like the Maoists of different denominations built their clout by articulating local grievances in east, central and southern India. These groups create localised threats as all of them resort to violence.
Second, Hindu extremism and militancy has also sunk strong roots in parts of India. Encouraged by the Hindutva discourse, these groups tend to use violence as a means of reviving the glory of Hinduism. These groups have targeted religious minorities, especially Christians and Muslims. The Hindutva and Hindu militancy have affected the frame of mind of a significant portion of middle and upper middle class Indians. This discourse has penetrated the bureaucracy and the military as well. If a large section of the populace develops a soft spot for the extreme Right, these groups get enough space to carry out their narrow, highly nationalist hateful agenda.
Islamic militancy has also developed in India among Muslim youths that feel alienated and marginalised in the Indian political system. India’s official data shows how the Muslims in general find themselves at the periphery of the politics and economy of India, with little hope of entertain the mainstream unless they are co-opted by the Indian elite and establishment. A good number of such youths are attracted to radical Islam to politically express themselves and challenge the system they perceive as unjust. Some of them emulate the discourse and strategies of Al Qaeda or the Laskhar-e Taiba, which strongly advocate armed resistance against anti-Islam forces.
Al Qaeda and Laskhar-e Taiba do not appear to be directly involved in the Mumbai attacks, but there could be some local radical outfits that are inspired by the disposition of these groups. Further, the role of the Mumbai underworld should not be ruled out.
Instead of looking outwards to look for the causes of this latest episode of violence, India should instead look inwards. It is easy to blame others for one’s trouble, a lot of people do that in Pakistan too. India is returning to the strategy of deflecting criticism of security lapses by blaming Pakistan.
The blame game between India and Pakistan serves the political agendas of both hard-line Hindus and hard-line Muslims, who have always opposed normalisation of India-Pakistan relations. It gives them an opportunity to mobilise support in their respective country.
Any deterioration in India-Pakistan relations would compel Pakistan to pull out a large number of its troops from the tribal areas and shift them to the eastern border with India. This will adversely affect Pakistan’s current efforts to control insurgency in the tribal areas, and will give a relatively free hand to these groups to pursue their agenda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This will not only benefit the militants operating on the western border with Afghanistan, but will also benefit the groups accused of committing terrorist acts in India.
If India is genuinely committed to eliminating terrorism, it needs to work together with Pakistan and adopt joint strategies rather than engage in a blame game.
Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst
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